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1. Introduction 
 
Behavioral finance studies the impact of psychological phenomena on financial 
behavior. In the center of the debate is the way people make decisions. In the course 
of making decisions people generally make observations, process data and arrive at 
judgments. In finance, these judgments and decisions pertain to the composition of 
individual portfolio, the choices of the securities, the expectations, the investment 
style, the horizon of investment, the turnover of the portfolio, the way investors react 
to news. As all human beings, individual investors use heuristics in the making of those 
judgments and decisions.  
In psychology, heuristics are simple, efficient rules, learned by experience, that 
have been proposed to explain how people make decisions, come to judgments, and 
solve problems, typically when facing complex problems or incomplete information.  
Heuristic methods can be viewed as mental short cuts used to ease the cognitive 
load of making a decision or finding a satisfactory solution (not an optimal one) for a 
problem. Examples of this method include using a rule of thumb, an intuitive judgment, 
or common sense. These rules work well under most circumstances, but in certain 
cases lead to systematic errors or cognitive biases. Cognitive biases is a pattern of 
deviation from rational behavior in judgment that occurs in specific situations. In a 
context where those specific situations occur, behavioral biases are therefore 
predictable and that’s why, according to behavioral finance, human beings may be 
considered as predictably irrational decision makers. Therefore, behavioral finance 
suggests a new framework to think about investors’ behavior. In the neoclassical 
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framework, financial decision makers possess Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
preferences over uncertain wealth distributions and use Bayesian rules to make 
appropriate statistical judgments using all available data. According to behavioral 
finance economists not only people do not behave according to Von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences and Bayesian rules, but they also systematically depart from 
the standard rational behavior. 
Much of the work of discovering heuristics in human decision-makers was done by 
the Israeli psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (2002 Nobel prized), 
but the knowledge has been developed dramatically in the last two decades. 
According to Hirshleifer (2001), most known judgments and decision biases have 
three common roots: heuristic simplification, self-deception and emotional loss of 
control. 
A first source of biases comes from heuristic simplification. Heuristic simplification 
happens when cognitive resource constraints (like read limited attention, processing 
power, and memory) force the use of heuristics to make decisions. 
Self-deception is a second source of bias and arises indirectly from cognitive 
constraints. Self-deception is a process of denial or rationalizing away the opposing 
evidence and logical arguments. It involves convincing oneself of a truth (or lack of 
truth) so that one does not reveal any self-knowledge of the deception. One deceives 
oneself to trust something that is not true as to better convince others of that truth.  
The biologist Trivers (1991) suggested that deception plays a significant part in 
human behavior and communication (as in animal behavior in general).  According to 
Trivers, self-deception has evolved so that one can have an advantage over another: 
the ability to read subtle cues such as facial expression, eye contact, posture, tone of 
voice, and speech tempo to infer the mental states of other individuals. In Trivers' self-
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deception theory, individuals are designed to think they are better (smarter, stronger, 
better friends) than they really are because truly believing this helps the individual fool 
others about these qualities. 
A third source of bias is that we are subject to emotions that can overpower reason. 
An evolutionary rationale for a lack of self-control is that emotions such as love and 
rage can act as mechanisms that allow credible commitment or threat toward potential 
allies and enemies (Hirshleifer 1987, Nesse 2001). 
Regardless of the behavioral biases’ roots, I present hereafter the most important 
behavioral errors that may affect the behavior of individual investors in financial 
markets, organized into five main categories1: 
 Perception and Processing 
 Framing and Mental Accounting 
 Representativeness 
 Emotions 
 Combining Effect: Overconfidence 
  
2. Perception and Processing Biases 
 
Since time and cognitive resources are limited, a person cannot analyze all the 
available data. Limited attention, memory, and processing capacities force a focus on 
subsets of the available information. On the other hand people also make unconscious 
                                                            
1 Different authors propose different groupings. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) differentiate three families of 
errors: a) availability, b) anchoring and c) representativeness. A different organization is proposed by Hirshleifer 
(2001) who identifies four types: a) perception, memory and processing, b) narrow framing, mental accounting 
and reference effects, c) representativeness and d) belief updating and combining effects. Shefrin (2002) split 
the heuristic driven biases into seven groups: availability, representativeness, regression to the mean, gambler’s 
fallacy, overconfidence, anchoring and adjustment and aversion to ambiguity.  
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associations which create selective focus on a subset of information (Hirshleifer 2001). 
For instance, experiments reveal that giving verbally possibly irrelevant information to 
subjects triggers associations that influence judgments (Gilovich 1981). Selective 
triggering of associations causes availability effects (Kahneman and Tversky 1973), 
the most widely recognized cognitive heuristic related to perception and processing.  
 
2.1. Availability Biases 
 
Availability refers to the fact that a decision maker relies upon easily available 
knowledge rather than on all the relevant information.  
Because of the availability bias, events that are easily called to mind are believed 
to have a greater likelihood of occurring. Although frequency and ease of recall should 
be correlated (in fact, the easiest an event is recalled the higher is the probability that 
this event actually occurs), the reality is that the ease of recall can be influenced by 
other factors. 
As an illustrative example of availability I recall the one presented by Shefrin 
(2002): when asked to answer which is the most frequent cause of death, homicide or 
stroke, the majority of people’s answers depends on the events that come readily to 
mind. And because people recall better glamorous causes of death than ordinary 
causes and also because glamorous causes are better covered by the media, they will 
probably answer “homicide” although the right answer is “stroke”.  
The availability bias contributes to understand the phenomena reported in financial 
markets of overreaction of stock prices to a series of good or bad news. According to 
the market efficiency theory, new information should more or less be reflected instantly 
in a security's price. Good news should raise a business' share price accordingly, and 
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that gain in share price should not decline if no new information has been released 
since. Reality, however, tends to contradict this theory. According to De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985), quite often participants in the stock market predictably overreact to new 
information, creating a larger-than-appropriate effect on a security's price.  
Furthermore, it also appears that this price surge is not a permanent trend - 
although the price change is usually sudden and sizable, the surge erodes over time. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) examine returns on the New York Stock Exchange for a 
three-year period. They separate the best 35 performing stocks into a "winners’ 
portfolio" and the worst 35 performing stocks were added to a "losers’ portfolio". They 
then track each portfolio's performance against a representative market index for three 
years. The authors found that the “losers’ portfolio” consistently beats the market 
index, while the “winners’ portfolio” consistently underperforms. In other words, it 
appears that the original "winners" would become "losers", and vice versa, because in 
the short horizon investors essentially overreact. In the case of loser stocks, investors 
overreact to bad news, driving the stocks' prices down disproportionately. The exact 
opposite is true with the “winners’ portfolio”. According to the availability bias, people 
tend to heavily weight their decisions towards more recent information, making any 
new opinion biased towards that latest news. 
 
2.2. Perception and Processing Related Biases 
 
Four important biases are directly related to our limited perception and limited 
capacity of processing: the salience bias, the halo effects, the cue competition and the 
familiarity bias. 
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i. Salience biases 
 
Salience refers to any aspect of a stimulus that, for any of many reasons, stands 
out from the rest. Because humans cannot pay attention to more than one or very few 
items simultaneously, they are faced with the challenge of continuously integrating 
and prioritizing different influences. Saliency detection is often studied in the context 
of the visual perception where it arises from contrasts between items and their 
neighborhood, such as a red dot surrounded by white dots, a flickering message 
indicator of an answering machine, or a loud noise in an otherwise quiet environment. 
However, salience may be the result of emotional, motivational or cognitive factors 
and is not necessarily associated with physical factors such as intensity, clarity or size. 
The error related to salience is that we tend to over-estimate the causal role (salience) 
of information we have available to us. An example of the salience bias in finance is 
provided by Barber and Odean (2006), who show that individual investors are net 
buyers of attention-grabbing stocks (for example, stocks in the news). According to 
the authors, attention-driven buying is the result of the difficulty that investors have 
searching amongst all the available assets they can potentially buy. 
Although the errors driven by salience are the most common errors of perception 
and processing, we have to consider other behavioral biases also related to perception 
and processing: the halo effect, the cue competition and the familiarity bias. 
 
ii. Halo effects  
 
The halo effect is a type of cognitive bias in which our overall impression of a 
person influences how we feel and think about his or her character. Our overall 
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impression of a person ("He is nice!”) impacts our evaluations of that person's specific 
traits ("He is also smart!"). 
Halo effects happen especially if the perceiver does not have enough information 
about all traits, so that he makes assumptions based on one or two prominent traits. 
These one or two prominent traits "overshadow" other traits, similar to the radiation of 
light in optical halo effects or halos in iconography (rings of light around someone's 
head). Edward L. Thorndike (1920) was the first psychologist to support the halo effect 
with empirical research2. Attractive people are often judged as having a more desirable 
personality and more skills than someone of average appearance. 
According to Schneider et al. (2012), the halo effect is most likely the most common 
bias in performance appraisal. In fact, when a supervisor evaluates the performance 
of a subordinate, she or he may give prominence to a single characteristic of the 
employee, such as enthusiasm, and allow the entire evaluation to be colored by how 
she or he judges the employee on that one characteristic. Even though the employee 
may lack the requisite knowledge or ability to perform the job successfully, if the 
employee's work shows enthusiasm, the supervisor may very well give him or her a 
higher performance rating than is justified by knowledge or ability. 
 
iii. Cue competition 
 
The cue competition effect refers to the situation when increasing the validity of 
one cue subjectively decreases the validity of another cue, even though the two cues 
                                                            
22 In a psychology study published, Thorndike (1920) asks commanding officers to rate their soldiers. He found 
high cross‐correlation between all positive and all negative traits. People seem not to think of other individuals 
in mixed terms;  instead we seem to see each person as roughly good or roughly bad across all categories of 
measurement. 
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are independent. The cue competition bias occurs in prediction tasks, i.e., when 
people have to predict future events on the basis of past experience with the current 
situation. For example, individual investors must forecast future economic trends on 
the basis of current economic indicators. If the effect of one cue on prediction is 
attenuated by increasing the validity of another cue, important errors may occur in the 
predicted scenario. Busemeyer et al. (1993) demonstrate empirically that increasing 
the validity of one cue decreases the effectiveness of another cue in a linear prediction 
task, even though the two cues were statistically independent. 
 
iv. Familiarity bias 
 
Familiarity bias is another shortcut the mind uses to filter information and make 
decisions which consists in the tendency to believe in and prefer things that are already 
familiar to us. It's not a conscious decision. People believe that the familiar company 
is actually better and that investment in the familiar has a lower risk and/or higher yield 
returns. This explains the widely studied home country bias which affects most 
investors’ behavior (French and Poterba 1991, Abreu et al. 2011). Even professional 
investors are known to allocate a larger fraction of their investments to domestic stocks 
than they should if they were adhering to standard portfolio theories that advocate 
diversification. Strong and Xu (2003), for example, find that investors are more 
optimistic towards their home markets than they are about foreign markets. 
Familiarity bias also explains why so many people invest so heavily in the 
companies they work for, even though this generally represents a very risky 
investment strategy. In fact, if both the job and financial assets are tied to one 
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company, this represents tying all future returns to the success of one single firm 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). 
 
3. Framing and mental accounting 
 
The second subcategory for heuristic simplification pertains to narrow framing, 
mental accounting, and related biases. 
Framing is a cognitive heuristic in which people tend to reach conclusions based 
on the 'framework' within which a situation is presented. Quoting Shefrin (2002), "the 
term frame dependence means that the way people behave depends on the way that 
their decision problems are framed.”3 Accepting the influence of framing means 
rejecting the rational theory of choice which assumes description invariance: 
equivalent formulations of a choice problem should give rise to the same preference 
order. In fact, there is much evidence that framing of options in choice problems 
systematically yields different preferences. People have different perspectives and 
come up with different decisions depending on how a problem is framed. 
Prospect theory, which is not discussed here in detail, is at the center of this 
subcategory, and is particularly important to explain some of the behavioral biases 
related to this category like the isolation effect, loss aversion, and reference points. 
From a financial point of view, frame dependence manifests itself in the way that 
people form attitudes towards gains and losses. People make one decision if a 
problem is framed in terms of losses, but behave differently if the same problem is 
framed in terms of gains. 
                                                            
3 Shefrin, Hersh (2000), p.29. 
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The effects of framing in decision making may be organized considering four 
different dimensions of the impact of framing in individual evaluation and decisions: 
frame and accessibility, anchoring and adjustment heuristic, framing and evaluation of 
outcomes according to prospect theory, and mental accounting. 
 
3.1. Frame and Accessibility 
 
Accessibility is the technical term for the ease with which mental contents come to 
mind. Accessibility changes with the framing of the decision problem. For example, 
the wording of an idea makes different thoughts accessible (Kahneman 2003). The 
statements “Asset A is a better investment than asset B” and “Asset B is a worse 
investment than asset A” convey the same information, but because each sentence 
draws attention to its grammatical subject, they make different thoughts available. 
Accessibility also reflects temporary states of associative activation. For example, 
the mention of a familiar social category temporarily increases the accessibility of the 
traits associated with the category stereotype (Fiske 1998). Moreover, accessibility is 
influenced by one’s emotional state. High emotional states greatly increase the 
accessibility of thoughts that relate to the immediate emotion and reduce the 
accessibility of other thoughts (Loewenstein 2000). An effect of emotional significance 
on accessibility was demonstrated by Rottenstreich and Hsee  (2001), which shows 
that people are less sensitive to variations of probability when valuing chances to 
receive emotionally loaded outcomes (kisses and electric shocks) than when the 
outcomes are monetary. 
Thus, the effect of framing on accessibility is very important and has different 
dimensions. Perhaps the most impressive example is presented by Kahneman (2003). 
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An ambiguous graphic symbol is shown in two contexts. It is perceived as the letter 
“B” within a sequence of letters, and is instead seen as the number “3” when placed 
within a sequence of numbers. Another important point that this example illustrates is 
the complete suppression of ambiguity in conscious perception. When the two graphic 
representations are shown separately, observers will not spontaneously become 
aware of the alternative interpretation. They “see” the interpretation of the object that 
is the most likely in its context, but have no subjective indication that it could be seen 
differently. Ambiguity and uncertainty are suppressed in perception.  
 
3.2. Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic 
 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic was first theorized by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974). Anchoring and adjustment is a psychological heuristic that 
influences the way people intuitively assess probabilities. More precisely, anchoring is 
a cognitive bias that describes the common human tendency to rely too heavily, or 
"anchor," on one trait or piece of information when making decisions. According to this 
heuristic, when one has to make a guess or an estimation, we start with an implicitly 
suggested reference point (the "anchor") and make adjustments to it to reach our 
estimate.  
Because we are better at relative thinking than absolute thinking (Kanheman 2011) 
we tend to base estimates and decisions on known ‘anchors’ or familiar positions, with 
an adjustment relative to this starting point. The initial value, or starting point, may be 
suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial 
computation. In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient. That is, different 
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased towards the initial values. 
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Tversky and Kahneman (1974) present a clear example of the bias induced by this 
heuristic. Subjects were asked to estimate the percentage of African countries in the 
United Nations. The subjects were instructed to indicate first whether that number was 
higher or lower than a specific percentage and then to estimate the value of the 
quantity by moving upward or downward from the given number. Different groups were 
given different starting percentages, and these arbitrary percentages had a marked 
effect on estimates. The median estimates of the percentage of African countries in 
the United Nations were 25 and 45 for groups that received a reference percentage of 
I0 and 65, respectively. Many other clear experiments of anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic are reported by Ariely (2008). 
 
3.3. Framing and evaluation of outcomes according to prospect theory 
 
Prospect theory4 distinguishes two ways of choosing between alternative 
prospects: by detecting that one dominates another or by comparing their values. The 
frame of a choice problem, which is the manner in which the choice problem is 
presented, has a great influence on the individual choice.  
The value function in prospect theory (which replaces the utility function in 
expected utility theory) has three key aspects that exacerbate the importance of the 
frame with which the choice problem is presented: 
 The value is assigned to gains and losses relatively to a starting point rather 
than to final assets (as the level of wealth);  
                                                            
4 For a deep understanding of prospect theory see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). 
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 People exhibit risk aversion in the positive domain and risk seeking in the 
negative domain except for very low or very high probabilities (so the value 
function is generally concave in the positive domain and convex in the 
negative domain); 
 People manifest loss aversion; the displeasure of losing a sum of money 
exceeds the pleasure of winning the same amount (the value function is 
steeper for losses than for gains). 
The importance of the framing of outcomes in finance is illustrated in the following 
experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). 
Problem 1: Choose between a) a sure gain of 240 u.m. and b) a 25% chance to 
gain 1000 u.m. and 75% chance to gain nothing. 
Problem 2: Choose between a) a sure loss of 750 u.m. and b) a 25% chance to 
lose nothing and 75% chance to lose 1000 u.m.. 
As implied by prospect theory value function, the majority of people choose a) in 
problem 1 and b) in problem 2. In problem 1, a  riskless  prospect  is  preferred  to  a  
risky  prospect  of even greater  expected  value. In problem 2, the majority of people 
chose b) which is consistent with risk seeking.   
The different frames with which the alternative choices are presented have a 
substantial effect on preferences because people behave differently in the domain of 
gains and in the domain of losses. In the domain of gains people are risk avert and in 
the domain of losses people are risk seeking.  
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3.4. Mental accounting 
 
Individuals need to record, summarize, analyze, and report the results of 
transactions and other financial events. Mental accounting is a description of the ways 
we do these things. More precisely, mental accounting, a concept first named by 
Thaler (1980) and developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), attempts to describe 
the process whereby individuals divide their current and future assets into separate, 
non-transferable accounts. The concept of mental accounting was later developed by 
Thaler (1999) who identifies three components. The first captures how outcomes are 
perceived and experienced, and how decisions are made and subsequently 
evaluated. A second component involves the assignment of activities to specific 
accounts. The third component of mental accounting concerns the frequency with 
which accounts are evaluated (daily, weekly, yearly, and so on). Each of the 
components of mental accounting violates the economic principle of fungibility (money 
in one mental account is not a perfect substitute for money in another account). 
Applied to financial behavior the theory considers that individuals assign different 
levels of utility to each asset group, and this affects investor’s investment decisions 
and other behaviors. Rather than rationally viewing every monetary unit as identical, 
mental accounting helps explain why many investors designate some of their funds as 
"safety" capital which they invest in low-risk investments, while at the same time 
treating their "risk capital" quite differently. Mental accounting is also related to narrow 
framing in Finance. An investor is said to suffer from narrow framing if he/she seems 
to make investment decisions without considering the context of his/her total portfolio, 
either by neglecting the other assets in the portfolio or by ignoring previous choices in 
a sequence of investment decisions. Shefrin and Statman (1993) describe how 
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brokers promote the sale of calls making them more attractive to their clients by 
framing the cash flow of the calls into three mental accounts corresponding to three 
different sources of profit: the call premium, the dividend, and the capital gain on the 
stock.  
 
3.5. Framing and mental accounting related biases 
 
Biases associated with this subcategory are largely related to oversimplification of 
a decision task, perhaps because time and cognitive resources are limited. In addition 
to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic bias already presented, there are a lot of 
other biases in this subcategory.  
We may differentiate three related groups of behavioral biases: biases directly 
related to prospect theory, which is at the center of this subcategory; biases motivated 
by prospect theory; and biases directly connected to financial market errors. In each 
category I present the most relevant biases to understand individual investors’ 
behavior. 
 
3.5.1. Biases directly related to prospect theory 
 
i. Reference points 
 
Peoples’ valuations of prospects depend on gains and losses relative to a 
reference point. This reference point is usually the status quo or current wealth. In a 
problem choice where the final result is the same in all alternative choices, but the 
starting point differs, people will evaluate the alternatives differently because those 
alternatives won’t be perceived as carrying equivalent gains/losses. The following 
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decision problem is an example of the reference point bias (from Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986). 
How would you choose in the following problem? 
Decision 1) Assume yourself richer by 300 u.m. than you are today. Then choose 
between a) gain 100 u.m. for sure and b) a 50% chance of gaining 200 u.m.. 
Decision 2) Assume yourself richer by 500 u.m. than you are today. Then choose 
between a) loosing for sure 100 u.m. and b) a 50% chance of losing 200 u.m.. 
Although the two decisions are effectively the same in terms of final wealth (in both 
cases the decision is between a) 400 u.m. for sure and b) 50% chance of 500 u.m. or 
50% chance of 300 u.m.) most respondents choose 1a) and 2b). This problem 
illustrates that people evaluate an outcome based on the gain or loss from a reference 
point, in this case the current wealth.  
 
ii. Loss aversion 
 
Loss aversion is a concept of social psychology as much as economics. It is not 
the reality of loss that matters, but the perception. People seem to feel more strongly 
a loss than a gain of equivalent absolute value. The loss aversion idea is central in 
prospect theory and has been demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with 
the following experiment: What value of x would make you indifferent between a) zero 
gain and b) 50% chance of gaining x and 50% of losing 25 u.m.? a) represents the 
status quo. The typical person requires a gain of 61 u.m. to be indifferent between 
accepting or rejecting the gamble. The risk neutrality implies x = 25 u.m., the upside 
has to be more than two times the absolute value of the downside in order to induce 
indifference between the choices. Loss aversion is the term that describes the fact that 
[Document title] 
 
20 
 
losses loom larger than gains. Loss aversion must be differentiated from risk aversion. 
While people also prefer a sure thing to a gamble with only positive outcomes when 
the expected values are identical, their aversion to such gambles is much weaker than 
when one of the outcomes pushes them into the loss domain, as in this choice 
problem. 
 
3.5.2. Biases motivated by, or associated with, prospect theory 
 
i. House money effect 
 
The house money effect, proposed by Thaler and Johnson (1990), describes the 
effect of prior outcomes on risky choices. Agents that exhibit the house money effect 
consider large or unexpected wealth gains to be distinct from the rest of their wealth, 
and are thus more willing to gamble with such gains than they ordinarily would be. 
Gamblers call this “playing with the house’s money.” Since they don’t yet consider the 
money to be their own, they are willing to take more risk with it. The house money 
effect predicts that investors who have experienced a gain or profit are often willing to 
take more risk. The house money effect is an example of mental accounting, in which 
agents mentally keep quantities of money in artificially separate “accounts.” Barberis 
et al. (2001) use the house money effect, along with first order risk aversion, to explain 
the high volatility of asset prices and the equity premium puzzle. 
 
ii. Regret 
 
Regret is the pain of mind on account of something done or experienced in the 
past, with a wish that it had been different. Regret means looking back with 
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dissatisfaction or with grief or sorrow, especially if this dissatisfactions results from the 
loss of some joy, or advantage. 
 
iii. Endowment effect 
 
The term endowment effect reports the fact that the value of one good increases 
once a person owns it. Loss aversion was first proposed as an explanation for the 
endowment effect by Kahneman et al. (1990). In fact, the endowment effect is 
consistent with prospect theory since losses (giving up the good) are felt more strongly 
than gains (receiving the good). However the authors also demonstrate that in some 
experiments loss aversion was not a sufficient explanation.  
 
iv. Status quo bias 
 
The status quo bias is a cognitive bias for the status quo. In other words, it refers 
to the fact that people tend not to change an established behavior unless the incentive 
to change is compelling. This tendency should be distinguished from rational 
preference for the status quo. The finding has been observed in many fields, including 
political science and economics. According to Ackert and Deaves (2010) the 
endowment effect and the status quo bias are equivalent heuristic errors. Kahneman 
et al. (1990) attribute it to a combination of loss aversion and the endowment effect, 
two ideas relevant to prospect theory. The authors created experiments that could 
reliably produce this effect. According to new research in psychology this individuals’ 
tendency to prefer to remain at the status quo is stronger when the decision is 
complex. Ariely (2008) provides a few experiments demonstrating that the more 
difficult the decision we face, the more likely we are not to act. 
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3.5.3. Biases directly connected to financial market errors 
 
Beyond the already presented mental accounting bias, which has obvious 
consequences on investors’ behavior, two other cognitive errors steaming from 
framing are of particular importance in finance: money illusion and the disposition 
effect. 
i. Money illusion 
 
In economics, money illusion refers to the tendency of people to think of currency 
in nominal, rather than real, terms. In other words, the numerical face value (nominal 
value) of money is mistaken for its purchasing power (real value). Money illusion is 
another form of heuristic simplification. Nominal prices provide a convenient rule of 
thumb for determining value and real prices are only calculated if they seem highly 
salient (e.g. in periods of hyperinflation or in long term contracts). This is an error 
because modern fiat currencies have no inherent value and their real value is derived 
from their ability to be exchanged for goods and used for payment of taxes.  
Money illusion conveys an old debate in monetary theory. The term was coined by 
John Maynard Keynes in the early twentieth century, and Irving Fisher wrote an 
important book on the subject, The Money Illusion, in 1928. The existence of money 
illusion is disputed by monetary economists who contend that people act rationally 
(that is, think in real prices) with regard to their wealth. However, Shafir et al. (2012) 
provides compelling empirical evidence for the existence of the effect and it has been 
shown to affect behavior in a variety of situations. Money illusion has been proposed 
as one reason why nominal prices are slow to change even where inflation has caused 
real prices or costs to rise.  
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But more important, money illusion can also influence people's perceptions of 
outcomes. Experiments have shown that people may perceive a 7% cut in nominal 
income as unfair, but see a 5% rise in nominal income where there is 12% inflation as 
fair5, despite them being almost rational equivalents.  
For individual investor’s behavioral analysis, money illusion means nominal 
changes in price can influence demand, even if real prices have remained constant. 
 
ii. Disposition effect  
 
The disposition effect is one of the most important, because costly, behavioral 
biases in finance. In fact, investors who show this bias usually hold poorly diversified 
portfolios and end up making bad financial decisions that are contrary to rational 
models of investment. Labeled by Shefrin and Statman (1984), the disposition effect 
describes the tendency that investors have to sell securities whose price is rising, the 
so-called winners, while keeping in portfolio securities whose price is declining, the 
losers. 
Three rational motives may justify the disposition effect: portfolio rebalancing, 
trading costs, and tax-related motives for selling stocks at a loss. However Odean 
(1998a) found disposition effect even after accounting for portfolio rebalancing and 
trading costs, and Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) consider that the disposition effect 
dominates tax-related motives for selling stocks at a loss. Several other empirical 
papers have documented the existence of disposition effect (Grinblatt and Keloharju 
2001, Shapira and Venezia 2001, Dhar and Zhu 2002). 
                                                            
5 Cf. Tversky and Kahneman (1986),  p.S261‐S262. 
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Much of the behavioral finance literature relates the disposition effect to loss 
aversion. Investors value a title gain or loss relatively to a reference point, usually the 
purchase price of the asset. When transactions are carried in the financial market, 
agents will evaluate their portfolio and whether the assets have appreciated or 
depreciated relative to the purchase price. Combining the analysis of the reference 
point with the fact that investors are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seekers 
in the domain of losses, it is easy to understand that if the asset price falls and remains 
below the reference point, investors, who value loss much more than a gain, will be 
averse to sell that asset for a loss, causing a reduction in the supply of potential sellers. 
The intuition behind how loss aversion can explain the disposition effect is that a 
winning stock is considered a gain, and as individuals are risk-averse in this domain, 
they will sell the stock. On the other hand, a losing stock would be considered a loss 
and being risk-seeking in this domain would cause the investor to hold the stock. The 
aversion to losses by investors is so strong that the impact of a loss on the usefulness 
(or value function) of individuals is estimated at about two times and a half higher than 
the impact of an equivalent gain. Thus, investors tend to avoid the realization of losses.  
Other behavioral finance explanations have been added to explain the disposition 
effect. Barberis and Xiong (2009) concludes that the investors’ tendency for selling 
winning stocks too early and holding losing stocks too long depends on the success 
of past investments. If past investments where set at a gain, the agents will be 
progressively less risk averse and will show more disposition effect. Muermann and 
Volkman (2007) focuses on how anticipating regret and pride in a dynamic setting may 
cause investors to optimally follow a strategy in which they sell winning stocks and 
hold losing stocks; that is, on how anticipating regret and pride can help explain the 
disposition effect. 
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4. Representativeness 
 
 
Representativeness is the third class of heuristic simplification and is used when 
making judgments about the probability of an event under uncertainty. Representative 
heuristic is a cognitive bias in which an individual categorizes a situation based on a 
pattern of previous experiences or beliefs about the scenario. The term proposed by 
psychologists Tversky and Kahneman (1982) is defined as "the degree to which [an 
event] (i) is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population, and (ii) reflects 
the salient features of the process by which it is generated". 
Like the other heuristic simplifications, representativeness often provides 
reasonable answers when trying to make a quick judgment or decision, but sometimes 
it leads to stereotypes, inducing errors. When people rely on representativeness to 
make judgments or decisions, they are likely to judge wrongly because of the fact that 
something is more representative does not make it more likely. The typical result is 
probability judgment error: thinking some event is more (or less) likely than it actually 
is (based on an inappropriate understanding of the situation). This error in the 
assessment of probabilities has different dimensions. 
 
4.1. Base rate neglect 
 
It happens when one evaluates the likelihood that a particular description of a 
subject belongs to an engineer rather than to a lawyer, by the degree to which this 
description was representative of the two stereotypes, with little or no regard for the 
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prior probabilities of the categories, that is the percentage of engineers and lawyers in 
the sample (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
 
4.2. Insensitivity to sample size 
 
To evaluate the probability of obtaining a particular result in a sample drawn from 
a specified population, people typically assess the likelihood of a sample result by the 
similarity of this result to the corresponding population. Because the similarity of a 
sample statistic to a population parameter does not depend on the size of the sample, 
the judged probability of a sample statistic will be essentially independent of sample 
size. For example, we access the probability that the average height in a random 
sample of ten men will be 1.8 meters, by the similarity of this result to the average 
height in the population of men. 
 
4.3. Misconception of chance  
 
People expect that a sequence of events generated by a random process will 
represent the essential characteristics of that process even when the sequence is 
short. In considering tosses of a coin for heads (H) or tails (T), for example, people 
regard the sequence of H-T-H-T-T-H heads to be more likely than H-H-H-H-H, which 
does not represent the fairness of the coin. 
 
4.4. Insensitivity to predictability 
 
It has been shown that people tend to believe that there is more predictability than 
is usually the case (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). For example, when people are 
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asked to predict the future value of a company and are given a very favorable 
description of the work environment in the company, they tend to believe there is a 
positive relationship, and a very high profit will appear most representative of that 
description. This mode of judgment violates the normative statistical theory. When 
predictability is nil, for example because the description of the company provides no 
information relevant to profit, then the same value (such as average profit) should be 
predicted for all companies. 
 
4.5. Representativeness related biases 
 
Two behavioral biases are particularly associated with representativeness: the 
Gamblers’ fallacy and the Hot hand fallacy. 
 
i. Gambler's fallacy 
 
The ''Gambler's fallacy'' is the belief that if deviations from expected behavior 
are observed in repeated statistical independent trials of a random process, then these 
deviations are likely to be evened out by opposite deviations in the future.  
For example, if a fair coin is tossed repeatedly and tails comes up a larger 
number of times than is expected, a gambler may incorrectly believe that this means 
that heads is more likely in future tosses. Chance is commonly viewed as a self-
correcting process in which a deviation in one direction induces a deviation in the 
opposite direction to restore the equilibrium. In fact, deviations are not "corrected", 
they are merely diluted.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1971) interpret this to mean that people believe that 
short sequences of random events should be representative of longer ones, 
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specifically in that deviations from average should balance out. This is to 
misunderstand the law of large numbers, where a large number of random events, 
such as coin tossing, will closely approach the natural distribution (in the example, 
50% heads and 50% tails). 
There is evidence from empirical works that the gambler’s fallacy is also present 
in the stock market. Andreassen and Kraus (1990) found that investors exhibit 
gambler’s fallacy in the presence of modest stock price fluctuations. 
 
ii. Hot hand fallacy 
 
The hot hand fallacy includes the assumption of a run of luck, where because 
one’s have won several times we feel we are more likely to continue winning. The hot 
hand fallacy also includes the opposite assumption of luck running out and being on a 
losing streak. Those fallacies can appear as a contradiction of the gamblers’ fallacy, 
where a run of success (or a run out of success) is assumed to continue. In fact, they 
both represent errors of misconceptions of chance. People generally look for rational 
explanations of their own experiences (as in attribution theory) and gamblers are no 
different. They are thus willing to accept theories about why they are winning or losing 
based on luck and their own skill.  
There is evidence from experiments and from surveys that stock market 
investors extrapolate trends in forecasting price movements. Andreassen and Kraus 
(1990) finds that in the presence of a strong trend of prices, stock investors’ exhibit hot 
hand fallacy. DeBondt (1993) reports that non-expert investors are optimistic in bull 
markets and pessimistic in bear markets, thus expecting the continuation of past 
trends in prices. 
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The hot hand fallacy encourages people to take risks by telling them they are 
lucky or on a 'winning streak'. 
 
5. Emotions 
 
Although emotional states have an undeniable influence on human actions and 
decisions, this influence has largely been neglected in economics. Damásio (2011) 
provides remarkable evidence that decision-making suffers without emotions. He 
clearly demonstrates that the neural systems for reason and emotion cannot be 
separated. Thus, decision making and emotions are interconnected. Psychologists 
generally agree on what emotions there are, and on what emotions are. Among the 
states that are unambiguously qualified as emotions there are social emotions (like 
anger, guilt, shame, pride); emotions generated by thoughts about what might have 
happened but didn't (like regret, rejoicing or disappointment); emotions generated by 
the thought of what may happen (like fear and hope); emotions generated by good or 
bad things that have happened (like joy and grief); emotions triggered by the thought 
of the possessions of others (like envy and jealousy). According to Elster (1998), an 
emotion may be defined by six observable features: cognitive antecedents (beliefs 
trigger an emotional response), intentional objects (emotions about a person or 
situation), physiological arousal (hormonal and nervous system changes trigger 
emotional responses), physiological expressions (emotions can be accompanied by 
physical expressions), valence (emotions can be rated on a scale with positive and 
negative feelings), and action tendencies (when one’s feel an emotion, we often feel 
an urge to act).  
How does emotion impact how individual investors make financial decisions and 
behave in financial markets? 
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5.1. The effect of mood 
 
Although it is frequently not obvious how to separate the role of emotions from 
that of fundamentals, empirical and experimental works make clear that emotions 
impact on how individual investors make decisions in a very direct way. No matter how 
experienced, all financial agents suffer the influence of their own emotions in their 
judgments and decisions in financial markets. According to Shiller (2000) the 
emotional state of investors when they decide on their investments is no doubt one of 
the most important factors causing the bull market in the late 1990s.  
Some recent research indeed seems to confirm that anomalous financial 
behavior can be explained by investors’ mood. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) 
examines the relation between morning sunshine at a country’s leading stock 
exchange and market index stock returns that day at 26 stock exchanges 
internationally from 1982-97. They found that sunshine is strongly significantly 
correlated with daily stock returns. A sunny day makes people more optimistic and so 
more likely to buy stocks. Consequently the authors find that positive (net-of-
transaction costs) profits can be made from substantial use of weather-based 
strategies.  
Edmans et al. (2007) finds that the outcomes of soccer games are strongly 
correlated with the mood of investors. They report a significant market decline after 
soccer losses. For example, a loss in the World Cup elimination stage leads to a next-
day abnormal stock return of -49 basis points. This loss effect is stronger in small 
stocks and in more important games. They also report an equivalent loss effect after 
international cricket, rugby, and basketball games. 
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However, the effect of mood in risk taking behavior is less clear. Some 
researchers6 suggest that happier people are more optimistic in general and so more 
optimistic about their likelihood of winning with their financial investments and 
consequently more prone to take on more risk. Other research7 argues that more 
optimistic people are less likely to invest because they are more risk averse. People 
in a good mood are less likely to gamble because they do not want to jeopardize the 
good mood. 
Emotions may also have an impact on trading behavior. Lo et al. (2005) uses a 
survey to construct measures of emotional states of day traders and correlate these 
measures with daily normalized profits-and-losses records. They find that subjects 
whose emotional reaction to monetary gains and losses was more intense on both the 
positive and negative side exhibit significantly worse trading performance.  
 
5.2. Greed and Fear 
 
Two common emotions are frequently associated with financial markets: greed 
and fear8. In fact, the fact that many people buy lottery tickets and, at the same time, 
buy insurance is difficult to explain disregarding the strong emotional content of those 
choices. Buying lottery tickets runs counter the prospect theory idea that people show 
loss aversion in the domain of gains. Also, buying those tickets has an expected 
negative return so it can hardly be understood as an investment. This choice may be 
interpreted by the desire to get rich quickly (greed), even though people know that the 
                                                            
6 Cf. Wright and Bower (1992). 
7 Cf. Isen et al. (1988). 
8 “Behind Greed and Fear” is precisely the title of one of the most well‐known books in behavioral finance. Cf 
Shefrin (2002). 
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probability that this happens is low. On the other hand, buying insurance, which runs 
counter the prospect theory idea that people show loss aversion in the domain of 
losses, and has also a negative expected return, is certainly related to fear, the fear of 
a great loss.  
 
5.3. Emotions and the disposition effect 
 
Besides greed and fear, other emotions are present in financial markets in many 
other different ways. The previously presented disposition effect is a clear example of 
that influence. Recent experiment by Summers and Duxbury (2012) favors emotion 
over prospect theory to explain the disposition effect. The authors claim that 
anticipated regret and rejoicing are necessary to generate behavior consistent with the 
disposition effect. The experiment reveals that the mere experience of a gain or loss, 
without the personal responsibility for the choice of the investment, doesn’t induce the 
disposition effect. If the stock the investor owns but didn’t choose performs poorly 
he/she experiences disappointment (but not regret) and when it performs well, he/she 
experience elation (but not rejoicing). Summers and Duxbury highlight that 
responsibility for an outcome leads to emotions with higher valence (regret and 
rejoicing) which are a prerequisite for the disposition effect. In the same line of 
reasoning, the experiment by Weber and Camerer (1998) confirms the importance of 
emotion on the disposition effect. The authors compare the function of common stock 
markets, in which selling a stock requires a deliberate action, with an ‘automatic 
selling’ market, in which all stocks are automatically sold at the end of each period and 
subjects have to rebuy the stocks (at the same price they were automatically sold for, 
with no transaction costs). A rational decision maker should behave identically in both 
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types of experiments. However the authors find that when the shares were 
automatically sold after each period, the disposition effect was greatly reduced. This 
finding is consistent with a role of emotions, because at the beginning of each period 
the negative feelings of regret and the positive feelings of rejoicing are suppressed. 
 
5.4. Affect 
 
Besides fear and regret, affect, a “faint whisper of emotion” (Slovic and Peters 
2006), may also play a role in decision-making. Affect means the specific quality of 
“goodness” or “badness” experienced as a feeling state (with or without 
consciousness), as a result of a positive or negative stimulus. For instance, when 
negotiating a new financial investment, if we immediately dislike the seller, the 
outcome is probably affected by this first sentiment. Affective responses occur rapidly 
and automatically. 
Affect may also be understood as a heuristic (Slovic et al. 2004), as a mental 
short-cut to access judgment or make a choice. Using an overall, readily available 
affective impression can be easier and more efficient than weighing the pros and cons 
of various reasons or retrieving relevant examples from memory, especially when the 
required judgment or decision is complex.  
For Bracha and Brown (2012) the influence of affect on investors’ decisions is 
inconsistent with the independence of decision weights and payoffs found in models 
of choice under risk, such as the expected utility theory. To attest for the evidence 
suggesting that affect has an influence on agents’ financial decisions they propose an 
alternative model of risky choice, affective decision-making, where decision weights 
(which they label affective) are endogenous.  
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5.5. Hedonic motivation 
 
Hedonic motivation refers to the classical motivational principle that people approach 
pleasure and avoid pain, and is gained from acting on certain behaviors that result 
from emotional feelings such as love, hate, fear, joy, etc. According to the hedonic 
principle, our emotional experience can be measured from bad to good and our 
primary motivation is to keep as close to good as possible. This pleasure-seeking 
motivation is also important to understand individual investors’ behavior. Some people 
trade in financial markets only because they like to do so. Dorn and Sengmueller 
(2009) examine the hypothesis that entertainment motives drive trading by combining 
survey responses and transaction records for a sample of more than 1,000 clients at 
one discount broker in Germany. The authors conclude that although investors do not 
only trade for entertainment purposes, clients classified as potentially entertainment 
driven trade more than their peers. Also, entertainment-driven investors turn over their 
portfolio of stocks, bonds, funds and options at roughly twice the rate of their peers. In 
the same line of reasoning some authors argue that investors who are more prone to 
sensation seeking trade more frequently. According to Zuckerman (1994), “sensation 
seeking is a trait defined by the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense 
sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take financial risks for the sake of 
such experience.”9 
As Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) puts it, for investors prone to sensation seeking 
‘‘the mere act of trading and the monitoring of a constant flow of ‘fresh stocks’ in one’s 
                                                            
9 Cf. Zuckerman (1994), p.27. 
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portfolio may create a more varied and novel experience than a buy and hold 
strategy”.10  
Although some biases relate directly to specific heuristics, other biases stem from a 
variety of factors. Among the most important biases that do not stem directly from 
specific heuristics is overconfidence. 
 
6. Combining effects: Overconfidence 
 
 
Some biases steam from a variety of factors and not only from one type of heuristic 
simplification. Overconfidence and the overconfidence effect is a well-established and 
probably the most widely studied behavioral bias of this type. Overconfidence is the 
tendency for people to overestimate their knowledge, abilities and the precision of their 
information, as well as their capacity to estimate future events and their capacity to 
control it.  
Overconfidence manifests itself in different forms: miscalibration, better-than-
average effect, illusion of control and excessive optimism. 
 
6.1. Miscalibration 
 
Miscalibration is a bias in which someone's subjective confidence in their 
judgments is reliably greater than their objective accuracy, especially when confidence 
is relatively high (cf. Lichtenstein et al. 1982). The overconfidence manifests itself by 
the miscalibration of subjective probabilities. More precisely, if someone is asked to 
                                                            
10 Cf. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), p.556. 
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define a x% confidence interval for the correctness of the answers to a set of 
questions, then proper calibration implies that about x% of the times the answers are 
correct. Empirical tests show that the confidence intervals that individuals usually 
provide are too narrow, resulting in correct answers lying within the confidence interval 
less often than an accurate sense of one’s limitation would imply. In the Fischhoff et 
al. (1977) study, events that individuals believe to be certain to occur actually occur 
only about 80% of the time, while events that people consider impossible to happen 
occur about 20% of the time.  
 
6.2. Better-than-average effect 
 
In addition to faulty precision, overconfidence may also manifest by people’s 
unrealistic tendency to believe that their abilities, knowledge and overall capacity to 
analyze available information are better than average.  
Perhaps the most celebrated better-than-average finding is Svenson’s (1981) 
finding that 93% of American drivers rate themselves as better than the median.  
Cannell’s (1989) survey on the American schools reported achievements 
described that 48 of the 50 US states scored above the national norm, while 90% of 
elementary schools and 80% of secondary schools exceeded the national norm. The 
frequency with which school systems claim their students outperform national 
averages has been dubbed the “Lake Wobegon” effect11.  
                                                            
11 Lake Wobegon effect  is named after the fictional town with the same name used by Garrison Keillor  in his 
famous  radio  show.  In Keillor's weekly monologue  the  closing words  are  "Well,  that's  the news  from  Lake 
Wobegon, where all the men are strong, all the women are good looking, and all the children are above average." 
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According to Ackert and Deaves (2010)12 the better-than-average effect is likely 
to be connected with motivational and cognitive mechanisms. On the motivational 
side, thinking ourselves better than average enhances self-esteem. On the cognitive 
side, the performance criteria that most easily come to mind are often those where we 
are the best. 
 
6.3. Illusion of control 
 
The illusion of control is the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to 
control events, for instance to feel that they control outcomes that they demonstrably 
have no influence over. In other words, the illusion of control is overestimating the role 
of skill relative to luck in the determination of outcomes. Accordingly, the Illusion of 
control effect describes the tendency for people to behave as if they might have some 
control over events or outcomes when in fact they have none. Along with the optimism 
bias, the illusion of control is one of the positive illusions. 
The effect was named by psychologist Ellen Langer (1975) and has been 
replicated in many different contexts: laboratory experiments, observed behavior in 
familiar games of chance such as lotteries, and self-reports of real-world behavior. 
Thompson (1999) provides a complete explanation of why illusion of control 
occurs. She argues that people use a control heuristic to judge their degree of 
influence over an outcome. More precisely people use a simple rule to reach an 
estimate of one’s control over achieving an outcome with two elements: one’s intention 
to achieve the outcome and the perceived connection between one’s action and the 
desired outcome. If one intendes an outcome and perceives a connection, then 
                                                            
12 Cf. P.111. 
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perception of personal control is high. Like most heuristics this simple rule often leads 
to accurate judgments but can also lead to overestimations of control because 
intentionality and connection can occur in situations in which a person has no control. 
For example, gamblers playing the slot machines pull the handles with the intention of 
getting a winning combination. When this action is followed by the desired outcome, a 
connection is established (action – outcome) and gamblers raise their levels of illusion 
of control. The same may also apply to investment returns.  
Besides this heuristic other factors contribute to the illusion of control. Personal 
involvement is essential for the illusion of control because otherwise the connection 
can’t be established. Success-oriented tasks increase illusion (because they lead 
people to overestimate the connection), failure experiences and the focus on losing 
have the opposite effect. 
Those different forms of overconfidence are interconnected. For example, 
people tend to be overconfident about both their abilities and their knowledge. People 
who are overconfident about their abilities overestimate their influence over outcomes. 
People who are overconfident about their knowledge tend to think they know more 
than they actually do. In particular, people who are overconfident about their 
knowledge tend to establish excessively narrow confidence intervals. Such people end 
up being surprised at their mistakes more often than they had anticipated. However 
these different manifestations of overconfidence don’t measure the same thing and 
research seems to show that they don’t induce the same errors in the financial 
behavior of individual investors. 
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6.4. Overconfidence and financial decision-making 
 
The most widely recognized consequence of overconfidence is that it induces 
higher trading volume. Overconfident investors, because either they overestimate the 
precision of the information they have, or because they think they have above average 
investment skills, trade more than rational investors. For De Bondt and Thaler (1995) 
overconfidence is the key behavioral factor needed to understand the overtrading 
puzzle. Odean (1998b) argues that the high level of trading volume is the most 
important effect of overconfidence. Statman et al. (2006) presents empirical evidence 
for the US market and argues that trading volume is particularly higher after high 
returns, as investment success increases the degree of overconfidence. Barber and 
Odean (2000) investigates the performance of 60,000 discount brokerage investors. 
The authors split the sample into quintiles of portfolio turnover. Results show that those 
trading the most have lower average monthly return. The evidence reported by the 
authors suggests that the traders were often conducted by misinformation of 
overconfident investors. 
Two different dimensions of overconfidence may have this impact on the trade 
behavior of individual investors. Investors may be overconfident in the sense that they 
underestimate the volatility of financial assets and as a consequence trade more. 
Those investors show a miscallibration bias. This approach is presented in Daniel et 
al. (1998) who models overconfidence as the degree of underestimation of the 
variance of information signals. 
On the other hand, investors may also be overconfident regarding their 
investment skills, particularly investors with high past performance. The intuition 
behind this argument is that the accumulation of successful market investments makes 
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investors increasingly overconfident and consequently makes them trade more. Due 
to a self-attribution bias, investors think they are above average (better than average 
bias) regarding their investment skills. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
that a higher degree of overconfidence leads to higher trading volume if we accept 
that high past returns are positively correlated with overconfidence. This better than 
average trading effect has been documented empirically by Glaser and Weber (2007) 
who provide evidence of a higher trading propensity by overconfident investors when 
they identify overconfident investors as those who think they are above average in 
terms of investment skills or past performance. This finding is consistent with other 
recent studies (see Deaves et al. 2009, Graham et al. 2009). In the same line of 
research, Barber and Odean (2001) claims that overconfidence is much higher among 
men than among women and that explains why men trade more than women. 
Beside this trading effect, overconfidence has also been associated with 
excessive risk taking. Empirical work by Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Nosic and 
Weber (2010) seems to indicate that overconfident investors are more prone to take 
on risk for which there is no apparent return benefit. 
Overconfidence may also affect the impact of information on individuals’ trading 
behavior. Forbes and Kara (2010) argues that individual investors’ self-confidence 
mediates how investment financial knowledge influences investors’ trading efficacy, 
and Abreu and Mendes (2012) find that the more overconfident and non-overconfident 
investors invest in information the more they trade, but the trading behavior is sensitive 
to the sources of information used. Overconfident investors trade less frequently when 
they collect information via friends and family, and non-overconfident investors trade 
more frequently when they use specialized sources of information. But Kirchler’s 
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(2010) experimental results show the opposite conclusion: the persistent 
underperformance of weak informed investors is not due to overconfidence. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
 
Throughout this section I have presented and discussed behavioral biases, with 
a special focus on financial markets. Those biases have already been studied 
empirically, but most of the existing empirical literature uses experimental economics 
and surveys, and only a handful of papers use real data from individual investors’ 
trading activity. In the second part of this lesson I use data from a big Portuguese bank 
with information on trades by individual investors in financial instruments, spanning a 
10-year period, and a survey from the CMVM to test whether non-rational motives did 
have any impact on individual investors’ behavior in the Portuguese market for 
warrants. 
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